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Abstract A method for dealing with monotonicity constraints in optimal control
problems is used to generalize some results in the context of monopoly theory, also
extending the generalization to a large family of principal-agent programs. Our
main conclusion is that many results on diverse economic topics, achieved under
assumptions of continuity and piecewise differentiability in connection with the
endogenous variables of the problem, still remain valid after replacing such
assumptions by two minimal requirements.
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1 Introduction
Agency theory has been the object of a growing literature in the last decades. One of
its major virtues has been to make possible that a large diversity of problems can be
handled within a unique framework. The trouble lies however in that, to deal with
the monotonicity constraints that typically intervene in the analysis, it has become
customary the adoption of strong differentiability assumptions with regards to
variables that are endogenous to the problem. Among other advantages, if the
function in question turns out to be continuous and piecewise differentiable one can
express that it is monotonous by imposing the constraint that its derivative is single
signed. This allows characterizing the solution by relying on standard optimal
control methods.
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But piecewise differentiability comes to be also important in ensuring that the
candidate monotonous functions satisfy the provisos needed for the solution to be
well-behaved, in the sense of sufficiently regular to involve a clear-cut economic
interpretation on every point of its relevant domain. The reason for this is that, under
piecewise differentiability, the necessary conditions define unambiguously the
shape of the searched policy-function on its whole domain, including the corner
points, which can be then associated with the prescription that different agents
choose the same policy.
Nevertheless, the cost of piecewise differentiability rests, as is well-known, in
the eventual loss of generality for the neglect of those monotonous functions that
represent potential candidates for the solution, despite not being piecewise
differentiable. For this reason, our goal in the paper will be to relax the
differentiability assumptions in principal-agent problems, though imposing on the
endogenous variables of the model conditions that allow ensuring a well-behaved
solution. To do this, however, instead of undertaking the tedious task of
removing the differentiability restrictions in each of the problems concerned,
the strategy will consist in relaxing an archetypical problem whose basic
model is shared with a large group of other principal-agent problems. Such a
procedure will allow us identifying the common properties of necessary
conditions from which most interesting conclusions have been directly derived
in the literature.
Accordingly, the next section is devoted to recollect the main features and results
in the now classical contribution of Mussa and Rosen (1978) on monopoly with
product quality. Section 3 begins with an example where, unlike in the standard
approach, the solution for the monopolist fails to be piecewise differentiable. This is
used to justify our generalization of Mussa and Rosen’s problem, in the sense of
replacing its differentiability restrictions by two mild provisos that ensure all
qualitative results to be unaffected after the change in the space of candidate
solutions. In Sect. 4, the same type of generalization is extended to other results in
the context of similar principal-agent and other screening problems. Our final
conclusions together with a brief summary are found in Sect. 5. All analytical
details have been relegated to an Appendix at the end of the paper.
2 The problem of monopoly with product quality
Mussa and Rosen (1978) examine the provision of a generic commodity that can be
produced in a number of different varieties. The particular level of quality for each
variety is represented by q, and the ‘‘breadth’’ of the product line comes to be ½q

; q.
Despite the similarity of the goods, they are not perfect substitutes. In this economy,
there is an indefinite number of consumers with taste parameters distributed in
accord with a continuous density function f(h) : F0(h) [ 0 defined on the range
½h; h.
The sellers know the form of f(h), but cannot distinguish among buyers prior to
an actual sale. Therefore, the monopolist does not proceed in the usual way of price
discrimination, having to apply a pricing policy, through a price-quality schedule, in
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order to allocate costumers along the quality spectrum by a process of self-selection.
Apart from this, each person has an identical utility function represented by:
Uðx; q; hÞ ¼ x þ hq ð1Þ
Here x denotes a composite commodity that is differentiated from the generic
type in question. Consumers’ valuations of quality vary in proportion to h, and each
person maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint:
PðqÞ þ x y ð2Þ
The function P(q) represents the price-quality schedule and y is income. P(q)
indicates the unique price that, for all buyers of a given quality q, is required in an
impersonal market where all quality varieties are sold. Both P(q) and y are measured
in terms of x. Moreover, at points where P(q) is differentiable, utility maximization
yields:
P0½qðhÞ ¼ h ð3Þ
If q(h) expresses the quality purchased by a person of type h, consumer surplus
accruing to any hypothetical purchaser h will then be given by:
zðhÞ ¼ hqðhÞ  P½qðhÞ ð4Þ
For any particular quality level, q, it is supposed that the unit cost, C(q), is
independent of the number of units of the particular variety considered. In addition,
C0(q) [ 0 and C00(q) [ 0. The monopolist seeks to maximize profit subject to the
constraint of individual behavior, by choice of an assignment q(h) and a non-
decreasing P(q), namely:
Problem 1 Find the functions P(q) and q(h) that1:
Maximize:
Zh
h
fP½qðhÞ  C½qðhÞgf ðhÞdh ð5Þ
subject to : qðhÞmaximizes x þ h qðhÞ under PðqÞ þ x y ð6Þ
PðqÞ is non-decreasing ð7Þ
Let {P*(q), q*(h)} depict the solution. As it stands, Problem 1 seems rather
difficult to handle, unless it can be transformed into another setting with P() not
appearing explicitly. Mussa and Rosen (1978) considered, in fact, this equivalent
program:
Problem 2 Find the functions z(h) and q(h) that:
1 Constraint (7) does not appear in Mussa and Rosen (1978) since it is implied, through condition (3), by
their differentiability assumptions on q(h) and P(q).
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Maximize :
Zh
h
fh qðhÞ  zðhÞ  C½qðhÞgf ðhÞdh ð8Þ
subject to:
zðhÞ ¼
Zh
h
qðfÞdf ð9Þ
qðhÞ is non-decreasing ð10Þ
The equivalence between (5) and (8) follows from the definition of z(h) in (4).
The envelope condition (9) was derived by differentiating (4), substituting (3) and
integrating between h and h for zðhÞ ¼ 0. Of course, for these calculations to be
valid, apart from the piecewise differentiability of q(h) and P(q), we must suppose
that Mussa and Rosen (1978) adopted the implicit assumption that z(h) is an
everywhere continuous function. Concerning condition zðhÞ ¼ 0 in (9), it stems
from (10) and the fact that, at an ‘‘extensive’’ margin ~hð hÞ; it is always optimal
for the monopolist to make the marginal consumer indifferent between buying and
not buying. Finally, (10) was justified by using geometrical methods in combination
with the assumptions mentioned.
Again restricting the set of candidates q(h) to functions that are piecewise
differentiable, Mussa and Rosen (1978) obtained these necessary conditions for
Problem 2:
MRðhÞ  MCðhÞ ¼ 0 if h is a point of increse for qðhÞ ð11Þ
Zh2
h1
½MRðhÞMCðhÞf ðhÞdh¼ 0 if ½h1;h2 isamaximalintervalof constancyforqðhÞ
ð12Þ
Here MC hð Þ ¼ C0 q hð Þ½  represents the marginal cost of producing an
increment of quality for consumers of type h at the optimum. Likewise,
MRðhÞ  h 1f ðhÞ½1  FðhÞ stands for the marginal revenue accruing to the
monopolist, and measures the gain in revenue associated with quality increments
sold to consumers of type h.
It must be emphasized in passing that Mussa and Rosen (1978) refer in (11)
to points where q0*(h) [ 0, instead of to the more general concept of points of
increase of q*(h). However we shall see below that (11) applies as well in
connection with points of increase where q*(h) does not present a positive
derivative.
Using C00(q) [ 0 Mussa and Rosen (1978) managed in addition to prove that:
qðhÞ is continuous everywhere: ð13Þ
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As a whole, conditions (11)–(13) mean that the optimal policy involves bunching
consumers of different tastes onto the same quality level by imparting corners in
P*(q) at some points, while equating marginal cost to marginal revenue elsewhere.
3 More general results
As has already been said, the trouble with the analysis of Mussa and Rosen (1978)
rests in its differentiability assumptions that limit the relevance of the results
achieved. The following example illustrates this point, motivating most of the
subsequent developments.
Example Apart from the assumptions adopted in the last section, suppose:
(a)
C qð Þ ¼ q
2
2
(b) f(h) is on ½h; h1Þ and ðh2; h the Cantor singular function. Besides, f(h) satisfies
on h1; h2½ :
MRðh1Þ ¼ MRðh2Þ ð14Þ
Zh2
h1
½MRðhÞ  MRðh1Þf ðhÞdh ¼ 0 ð15Þ
Zh2
h
½MRðfÞ  MRðh1Þf ðfÞdf[ 0 ð16Þ
Recall that MRðhÞ  h  1f ðhÞ½1  FðhÞ: Now, let us consider the solution for q(h):
qðhÞ ¼ MRðh1Þ on ½h1; h2 ð17Þ
qðhÞ ¼ MRðhÞ on[h; h1Þ and ðh2; h ð18Þ
Equations (17)–(18) together with assumption b imply that qðhÞ is a non-
decreasing continuous function that has an uncountable set of non-differentiable
points. It therefore fulfills constraint (10) without being piecewise differentiable. In
fact q hð Þ is strictly increasing, except for the interval h1; h2½  where it appears to be a
constant function.
Now we shall check that q hð Þ entails a true solution to Problem 2 above.2 Let
z hð Þ be the value in (9) attained by z(h) for qðhÞ ¼ q hð Þ: If q^ðhÞ; z^ðhÞf g represents
any pair satisfying (9)–(10), it will be shown to provide at most the same level of
profit as qðhÞ; zðhÞf g: Thus, by the concavity of the integrand in (8) with respect to q
and z (since the Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite for all q and z):
2 Note that the equation in (18) gives for qðhÞ a solution that, due to (15)–(16), violates constraint (10) on
[h1, h2]. Hence first order conditions alone would lead in this case to a non-optimal solution to Problem 2.
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Zh
h
fhq^ðhÞ  z^ðhÞ  C½q^ðhÞgf ðhÞdh
Zh
h
fhqðhÞ  zðhÞ  C½qðhÞgf ðhÞdh
þ
Zh
h
f h C0½qðhÞ½  q^ðhÞ  qðhÞ½   z^ðhÞ  zðhÞ½ gf ðhÞdh
ð19Þ
At this point, it will suffice to prove that the last integral in (19) becomes non-
positive. Using assumptions a–b:
Zh
h

h qðhÞ  1
f ðhÞ½1  FðhÞ þ
1
f ðhÞ½1  FðhÞ
 
:
q^ðhÞ  qðhÞ½   z^ðhÞ  zðhÞ½ 

f ðhÞdh
¼
Zh2
h1
MRðhÞ  MRðh1Þ½  q^ðhÞ  qðh1Þ½ f ðhÞdh
¼
Zh2
h1
MRðhÞ  MRðh1Þ½  q^ðhÞ  q^ðh1Þ½ f ðhÞdh ð20Þ
The second integral stems from (17)–(18) and:
Zh
h
1
f ðhÞ½1  FðhÞ
 
q^ðhÞ  qðhÞ½   z^ðhÞ  zðhÞ½ 
 
f ðhÞdh
¼
Zh
h
Zh
h
f ðfÞdf½q^ðhÞ  qðhÞdh
Zh
h
Zh
h
q^ðfÞ  qðfÞ½ dff ðhÞdh ¼ 0
ð21Þ
Here, the zero result can be checked by reversing the order of integration
(Fubini’s Theorem) in any of the two double integrals, while leaving the other as it
stands. As for the third integral in (20), it derives from a direct application of (15).
Now, by Lebesgue’s theorem on bounded convergence, for any e[ 0:
Zh2
h1
1
e
Zhþe
h
MRðfÞ  MRðh1Þ½ f ðfÞdf q^ðhÞ  q^ðh1Þ½ dh !
Zh2
h1
MRðhÞ  MRðh1Þ½  q^ðhÞ  q^ðh1Þ½ f ðhÞdh; as e ! 0
ð22Þ
126 SERIEs (2011) 2:121–137
123
The limit becomes legitimate since MRðfÞ  MR h1ð Þ½  f(f) is a continuous
function and:
1
e
Zhþe
h
MRðfÞ  MRðh1ÞÞ½ f ðfÞdf q^ðhÞ  q^ðh1Þ½ dh !
MRðhÞ  MRðh1Þ½  q^ðhÞ  q^ðh1Þ½ f ðhÞ as e ! 0 ð23Þ
Finally, the left-hand side of (22) is equal to3:
1
e
Zh2e
h1e
Zh2
h
MRðfÞ  MRðh1Þ½ f ðfÞdf q^ðh eÞ  q^ðh1Þ½  dh
 1
e
Zh2
h1
Zh2
h
MRðfÞ  MRðh1Þ½ f ðfÞdf q^ðhÞ  q^ðh1Þ½ dh
¼ 1
e
Zh1
h1e
Zh2
h
MRðfÞ  MRðh1Þ½ f ðfÞdf q^ðh eÞ  q^ðh1Þ½ dh
þ 1
e
Zh2e
h1
Z h2
h
MRðfÞ  MRðh1Þ½ f ðfÞdf q^ðh eÞ  q^ðhÞ½ dh ð24Þ
Due to (15), the first term on the right of (24) tends to zero as e ! 0: The second also
tends to zero, when e ! 0: The third term is clearly non-positive, in the light of (16)
and the fact that, since q^ðhÞ is non-decreasing, q^ðh eÞ q^ðhÞ: It follows that
fqðhÞ; zðhÞg turns out to be a true solution to Problem 2 in the simple case here
considered.
One can observe from (15) and (17)–(18) that fqðhÞ; zðhÞg fulfills conditions
(11)–(12). Moreover, the continuity of qðhÞ implies that proviso (13) is also
satisfied. The example suggests in this sense that piecewise differentiability may be
an excessively strong requirement that rules out many optimal policies stemming
from the necessary conditions for an optimum. It seems natural therefore to explore
the possibility of extending the relevance of conditions (11)–(13) to a more general
framework where piecewise differentiability is not inevitably present. This will be
done with the help of:
Restriction i: Jumps in q(h) can only occur on intervals all of whose points are
points of increase.
Here h is said to be a point of increase of q(h) if, for all h00 and h0 such that
h00 [ h[ h0, always: q(h0) [ q(h) [ q(h0). Of course, when every point of increase
belongs to an open interval all of whose points are points of increase, on that
interval the function concerned must be strictly increasing. But points of increase
may define sets of a more complex structure, such as nowhere-dense sets and other
possible types of Cantor sets.
3 A similar step is found in the proof of Mirrlees (1969, Theorem 2).
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Restriction ii: q(h) cannot contain points of increase on intervals of singularity.
As is well-known, a function is singular on an interval if its derivative there
vanishes almost everywhere. Conspicuous examples of non-constant singular
functions are the Lebesgue’s Singular Function, also called the Cantor Function, and
the (paradoxical) strictly increasing singular function [cfr. Taka´cs (1978) for many
examples]. Proviso ii means that if q(h) is continuous and singular on an interval, it
becomes constant there.
Definition A function q(h) is said to be well-behaved if it fulfils Restrictions i–ii.
A notable subset of well-behaved functions turns out to be that of absolutely
continuous functions, i.e. those expressible as an integral of their own derivative.
Consequently, all continuous and piecewise differentiable functions q(h) always are
well-behaved, but the converse is far from true. In fact, any non-decreasing q(h)
may contain a countably infinite set of jumps, together with an uncountable null set
of non-differentiable points, and still be well-behaved. Note that the property is
clearly less demanding than the regularity condition imposed in Theorem 4.2 of
Milgrom (2004, p. 113), since it allows for intervals on which q(h) becomes
continuous without being absolutely continuous.
Recall that the piecewise differentiability of q(h) and P(q), together with the
continuity of z(h), was used by Mussa and Rosen (1978) when showing the
correspondence between (6)–(7) and (9)–(10). Notwithstanding this, the next
proposition allows substituting Problem 1 for Problem 2 without resort to such
assumptions:
Proposition 1 Constraints (9)–(10) are equivalent to constraints (6)–(7) within
the set of all candidate trajectories q(h) that come to be well-behaved.
Proof See Ruiz del Portal (2007b). h
The proof of Proposition 1 is a direct adaptation of the proof of Theorem 1 in
Mirrlees (1971). Our main result can now be enunciated as:
Theorem Let {z*(h), q*(h)} be a well-behaved solution to Problem 2. Then, it
satisfies conditions (11)–(13) above.
Proof See the Appendix. h
The Theorem confirms the qualitative properties alleged by Mussa and Rosen
(1978), without imposing the piecewise differentiability of q(h). Other requirements
present in Mussa and Rosen (1978), such as the differentiability of C0(q), or the
continuity of f(h), are not needed either for the proof in the Appendix, as it can be
easily checked.
In addition, our Theorem helps to explain why the solution of the example above
satisfies the standard conditions (11)–(13) despite not being piecewise differentia-
ble. Thus, now we can see that, since qðhÞ is a well-behaved solution, sufficient
conditions (17)–(18) are also necessary for Problem 2. In reality, the fact that
constraint (10) is binding on h1; h2½  in the optimum implies that the only way to
show that (17)–(18) are the true necessary conditions is by invoking our Theorem.
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It should be emphasized on the other hand that no advanced optimization
technique is required for the derivation of the Theorem, provided the procedure in
the Appendix just consists in transforming Problem 2 into another program where
we do not have to deal directly with constraint (10) above. The reason for the
transformation, which is the key point of the proof, lies in that optimal control
problems do not allow in general for constraints restricting functions to be
monotonous (and well-behaved). In the new program, the constraints replacing (10),
i.e. (35)–(37) below, can easily be handled with the help of any standard theorem in
optimal control theory that provides for equality-phase constraints. As to the
concrete choice of Theorem 12.1 in Makowski and Neustadt (1974), it is justified on
the basis of its wide enough scope of application for extending our Theorem to a
large variety of problems, such as those discussed in the next section.
Concerning the role plaid by Restrictions i–ii in the derivation of (11)–(13), it
must be stressed that, without them, instead of these necessary conditions our
analysis in the Appendix would lead us to the statement of necessity:
Zh00
h0
MRðhÞ  MCðhÞ½ f ðhÞdh ¼ 0 if h00; h0 are points of increase of qðhÞ not
contained in an open interval of singularity:
ð25Þ
Restriction ii permits deleting the underlined part of (25), hence excluding from
the set of candidates q(h) those functions not having a stair-case shape on intervals
of singularity. In turn, Restriction i enables through Lemma 3 below the
equivalence between (25), once deleted its underlined part, and condition (11).
Therefore, Restriction i guarantees that the equality MC hð Þ ¼ MC hð Þ can apply at
any point of increase of q*(h), even when this point does not belong to an interval of
strict increase. Together, Restrictions i–ii also entail the continuity of q*(h) at every
end-point of any maximal interval of constancy. This involves that all intervals
where q*(h) presents a staircase shape are intervals of constancy, thus allowing to
derive conditions (12)–(13) from (25), by basing the argument upon continuity
reasons.
In passing, it is interesting to check that ‘‘well-behavingness’’ is a binding
requirement in the sense that, without it, we could not find a solution to Problem 2
that is not well-behaved but satisfies conditions (11)–(12) in the Theorem. First, the
failure of Restrictions i–ii implies that q*(h) cannot be constant along any maximal
interval of singularity, therefore preventing that condition (12) can ever hold.
Second, the need for (11) of i comes from that, due to the continuity of MR(h) and
C0(q), jumps in q*(h) become impossible on domains where (11) holds. Finally, a
continuous q*(h) cannot violate ii and at the same time fulfill (11) since, as can be
seen by totally differentiating (11), this would mean that q*(h) is also continuously
differentiable almost everywhere.4
4 Note that, on points where (11) holds and there is a vanishing derivative of q*(h), the function f(h) in
MR(h) becomes continuously differentiable.
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4 Other principal-agent problems
As is well known, the problem of monopoly with product quality belongs to a
broader family of problems that share with it a common structure. This family
includes, among other topics, optimum nonlinear taxation [e.g., Seade (1977),
Brunner (1993)]; non-linear prizing [e.g., Spence (1977), Armstrong (1996)]; the
theory of the monopolist [e.g., Goldman et al. (1984) and Rochet and Chone´
(1998)]; the problem of optimal insurance [e.g., Stiglitz (1977)]; the so-called
‘‘principal agent problem’’ [e.g., Guesnerie and Laffont (1984)]; the optimal design
of auctions [e.g., Milgrom (2004)]; the theory of incentives [e.g., Laffont (2000)].
A permanent feature in this family of problems is the existence of a vector
parameter h denoting a number of characteristics (i.e. ability, wage, taste, age, etc.)
that are distributed in the population obeying a continuous density function f(h). The
principal ignores the characteristics of each agent, since his knowledge of h is
confined to a statistical level. The aim is to characterize a vector P(q) of policy-
functions and a vector q(h) of decision profiles, which optimize an objective-
function (e.g. social welfare, consumer surplus, profit, pay-off, etc.) subject to
several constraints. One of these constraints reflects individual behavior and
contains the searched policy-functions.
As a second aspect in common, the solution is characterized by deriving the
necessary conditions of an ‘‘instrumental program’’ where, as in Problem 2 above,
P(q) is absent and the restriction of individual behavior is only implied. In its place
we find, provided an appropriate single-crossing proviso is satisfied, one or several
differential (or integral) equations supplemented by one or several monotonicity
constraints denoting, respectively, first and second-order conditions for utility
maximization. Customarily, the justification of the instrumental problem is based on
the existence of a so-called ‘‘Constraint Simplification Lemma’’, or of a ‘‘Constraint
Reduction Theorem’’.
Another affinity in these problems is that, thanks to their piecewise differentia-
bility assumptions on q(h) guaranteeing that a well-behaved solution be achieved in
the terms of our definition, the necessary conditions invariably exhibit two types of
statements.5 First, there appears one or several point-wise conditions, similar to
(11), holding at points where the solution exhibits a non-vanishing derivative. And
second, there arises one or several integral conditions, applying like (12) at intervals
of constancy, which depict the existence of corners in the optimal policy-functions
P(q).
All of these considerations suggest the possibility of extending the necessary
conditions in principal-agent problems to a new framework where differentiability
restrictions are not present, same as we have done with the problem of monopoly
with product quality. A strong argument for this is that, after inspecting the proof of
our Theorem above one can check that, for most of the problems mentioned, the
procedure in the Appendix suggests a pretty straightforward derivation of necessary
conditions at the optimum.
5 Some contributions, like Milgrom (2004, Ch. 4), relax to a significant extent the differentiability
conditions on q(h) in the justification of the instrumental problem, but not in the characterization of q*(h).
130 SERIEs (2011) 2:121–137
123
Anyway, two possibilities must be distinguished with regards to the models
concerned:
4.1 P(q), q(h) and h are just scalars
When this is the case, the method of proof of Theorem 1 in Mirrlees (1969, 1971)
applies integrally, same as in our Proposition 1, and a single differential (or integral)
equation, supplemented by a single monotonicity constraint, will suffice to depict
the restriction expressing individual behavior. Therefore, a distinction between the
original problem and an analogous instrumental program can be established,
perhaps after some few adaptations, without invoking any kind of differentiability
assumption on P(q) and q(h). Now the monotonicity constraint will only require
q(h) to be well-behaved, with restrictions i–ii expressed in terms, not just of points
of increase, but of points of strict monotonicity so as to allow for constraints of non-
increase.
It can be shown that, following the steps in the Appendix with respect to the
resulting instrumental program, we shall reach both a pointwise condition and
two interval conditions, similar to (11)–(12), as the necessary provisos that
characterize the solution. This will be so provided there exist two circumstances,
in connection with problems considered here, which ensure achieving the
provisos mentioned. On the one hand, the transformation of the monotonicity
constraint on q(h) into identical constraints to (34)–(37) below may always be
done as seems perfectly obvious; of course, the inequality in (37) must be
reversed in case we face a monotonicity constraint of non-increase. On the
other, the theorem considered in the Appendix, i.e. Makowski and Neustadt
(1974, Theorem 12.1), presents a wide enough scope of applicability to allow for
a complete characterization of the solution to the instrumental program in
question.
In fact, once transformed the monotonicity constraint all we must do is to convert
the resulting program into a minimization problem of Mayer, same as Problem 3 in
the Appendix. The application to it of Theorem 12.1 in Makowski and Neustadt
(1974) will lead us invariably to the above described structure of necessary
conditions. Aspects such as the adoption of a more general utility function will not
involve any significant departure from the basic model, as long as a suitable single-
crossing condition is assumed. Identical arguments can be said of the inclusion of
additional constraints denoting production possibilities, or any other restriction on
the principal, since this will introduce a new addend in the resulting necessary
conditions, but nothing else. All this has been confirmed in Ruiz del Portal (2007a)
for the problem of optimum income taxation, thus supporting the idea that
derivation of similar results for other principal-agent problems is fairly routine when
P(q), q(h) and h are just scalars.
Incidentally, an additional advantage to be remarked from our approach in the
Appendix is that the continuity assumption, present in all problems here with
regards to the density function f(h), may be relaxed to some extent. Thus, one can
assume f(h) to be discontinuous up to an at most countable set of points without
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modifying the line of argument and type of results in the Appendix.6 In contrast,
even when f(h) is assumed to be continuous Mussa and Rosen’s conclusion on the
global continuity of q*(h) will not naturally arise for q*(h), as a parallel condition to
(13) above, unless some additional assumptions can be adopted for the particular
problem in question.
4.2 P(q), q(h) or h may be vectors
Here, the greater degree of complexity involved explains that on occasions the
characterization of the solution be made under the so-called ‘‘first-order approach’’,
i.e. a heuristic method for dealing with the instrumental program, implying the
neglect of monotonicity constraints under the assumption that they will end up
satisfied in the optimal solution.7 Only few contributions, such as Rochet and Chone´
(1998), allow for the monotonicity constraints when h, q(h) and P(q) can be vectors.
However, either adopting the first-order approach, or taking into account the
monotonicity constraints expressive of second-order conditions for utility maximi-
zation, it seems hard to extrapolate our results in the preceding section to some of
these problems successfully. To begin with, we have to confine the analysis to
models in which h is one-dimensional, provided there is no theorem on optimal
control theory, to the best knowledge of the author, allowing for multidimensional h
and containing the possibilities of application in Theorem 12.1 of Makowski and
Neustadt (1978).
On the other hand, although one can always conjecture that, at least when h is a
scalar but P(q) and q(h) are still vectors, an equation like (38) below may always be
found by proceeding as in the Appendix, the resulting pointwise condition
equivalent to (11) will hold in that case only almost everywhere. The reason for this
rests in the fact that the sort of proof, employed in Lemma 3 below, fails to work
without assuming that q*(h) is continuous up to an at most countable set of points,
something that is implied in the monotonicity constraint when q(h) turns out to be a
scalar.
5 Conclusions
We have reinvestigated the question of characterizing solutions to principal-agent
problems, from the necessary conditions for an optimum, in economies where
individual characteristics h become unknown. The standard approach adopts strong
assumptions on the candidates for the solution, which typically consist in restricting
the analysis to decision profiles q(h) that are piecewise differentiable. However,
even in environments where continuity of the solution q*(h) is formally established,
piecewise differentiability implies a non-negligible loss of generality. This
6 Note that this conclusion is a natural complement of our result before, since the pointwise necessary
condition will lead usually to discontinuities in q*(h) at those points where f(h) is discontinuous.
7 In the context of contract theory Mirrlees (1975) has noted that necessary conditions for a contract to
solve the first-order program are not even necessary conditions for the valid program. This was confirmed
in our example, where we saw that the solution to the first-order program violates (17), hence (10).
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limitation has been illustrated with an example showing, not only the existence of a
non-piecewise differentiable q*(h), but also that if such q*(h) is well-behaved, in the
sense of not too uneven, it will fulfil identical necessary conditions as under
piecewise differentiability.
Taking the example as a starting point, the present paper has relaxed the standard
assumptions by considering well-behaved decision profiles, those such that: (i) jumps
in q(h) just occur on intervals all of whose points are points of strict monotonicity,
and: (ii) intervals of singularity for q(h) cannot contain points of strict monotonicity.
In doing so, we have proceeded by first relaxing piecewise differentiability in the
quality provision model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), to demonstrate afterwards that
the same sort of generalization applies to a large class of agency problems. As a
consequence of it, existing results prove to be more general than initially noted,
holding as well under weaker conditions than those adopted, not only for endogenous
objects like q(h), or the policy-function P(q), but also for an exogenous object like
the density function of types f(h). More precisely, the conclusions that appear are:
(1) Qualitative results in Mussa and Rosen (1978) still apply after replacing the
piecewise differentiability of P(q) and q(h) by Restrictions i–ii.
(2) Conclusion 1 holds as well in connection with programs of the principal-agent
type such that P(q), q(h) and h are one-dimensional. The only exception here is
the result on the global continuity of q*(h), which seems to depend heavily on
the particular characteristics of Mussa and Rosen (1978)’s problem.
(3) Conclusion 2 also applies even if f(h) is allowed to be discontinuous up to an at
most countable set of points.
These conclusions extend considerably the scope of principal-agent theory, thus
implying that main results in the literature are robust when P(q), q(h) and h become
scalars. It would be good therefore to explore the possibility of achieving similar
conclusions in the context of models where P(q), q(h) or h may be multidimensional.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
To obtain conditions (11)–(13) when q(h) is only required to be well-behaved, our
strategy will consist in transforming Problem 2 into another program, suitable to be
treated under the current methods of control theory. This is done in Proposition 2
after passing through Lemmas 1–2 below. Then we proceed to the application of a
theorem by Makowski and Neustadt (1974) which will lead, with the help of
Lemma 3, to the searched conditions (11)–(13). It must be anticipated anyhow that,
due to their length, all proofs in this section have been left in a working-paper.8
The first step in the procedure outlined will be to express (10) as a more
manageable set of constraints. Since the well-behaved solution to Problem 2 must
8 Interested readers have available, on request, a copy of Ruiz del Portal (2007b) with all the proofs.
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be non-decreasing on the whole domain ½h; h; it may therefore be uniquely
represented, according to Lebesgue’s Decomposition Theorem, as:
qðhÞ ¼ cðhÞ þ /ðhÞ; a:e: ð26Þ
(As usual ‘‘a.e.’’ means almost everywhere, or possibly excluding a set of
measure zero). Both functions on the right hand side of (26) are non-decreasing.
Besides, c*(h) becomes absolutely continuous while /*(h) is singular, i.e. its
derivative is zero a.e.
In principle, Eq. 26 suggests that q(h) = c(h) ? /*(h) might be the kind of
expression we are looking for. Thus, if /*(h) is treated as known in advance, one
can always characterize q*(h) through the optimal solution for c(h). This function,
and therefore also q(h), is easily ensured to be non-decreasing by just imposing its
absolute continuity together with the constraint c0(h) C 0 a.e. Of course, c(h)
could play here the role of a state variable while c0(h) would operate as a control
variable.
One trouble with such approach is however that, while q*(h) must be well-
behaved, the resulting functions q(h) are not ensured to be so. To solve this
question, we shall transform /*(h) into a more convenient function by defining, for
any arbitrary 1 [ k [ 0:
rðhÞ ¼ kc0ðhÞ ð27Þ
Since r*(h) is a summable function:
RðhÞ  RðhÞ ¼
Zh
h
rðfÞdf ð28Þ
From (2) we can formulate:
nðhÞ ¼ qðhÞ  RðhÞ ð29Þ
Lemma 1 The function n*(h) in (29) is non-decreasing and satisfies the
requirements for q*(h) to be well-behaved. Hence, n*(h) is only singular on
intervals of constancy.
Corollary If R*(h) is constant on an interval, then q*(h) is constant there as well.
Now, let us consider the following setting:
Problem 3
Minimize : PðhÞ ð30Þ
subject to:
P0ðhÞ ¼ hqðhÞ  zðhÞ  C½qðhÞf g f ðhÞ; a:e: ð31Þ
P0ðhÞ ¼ 0 ð32Þ
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z0ðhÞ ¼ qðhÞ; a:e: ð33Þ
zðhÞ ¼ 0 ð34Þ
qðhÞ ¼ RðhÞ  nðhÞ ¼ 0; a:e: ð35Þ
R0ðhÞ ¼ rðhÞ; a:e: ð36Þ
rðhÞ 0; a:e: ð37Þ
The functions G(h) and R(h) are assumed to be absolutely continuous, while r(h)
is measurable and almost bounded. All of them play the role of auxiliary variables,
unlike n*(h) that will be treated here as though it were known in advance. These
conventions will prove to be sufficient to convert Problem 3 into another
formulation of Problem 2, now as a minimization problem. Also note that
Problem 3 adopts the form of a control problem of Mayer, as in the theorem
invoked below to characterize {q*(h), z*(h)}.
Lemma 2 Every function q(h) compatible with (35)–(37) is non-decreasing and
well-behaved. Moreover, one of these q(h) coincides with q*(h).
Lemmas 1–2 above intervene in the proof of:
Proposition 2 Let {G(h), R(h), r(h), q(h), z(h)} be a solution to Problem 3.
Then {q(h), z(h)} coincides with {q*(h), z*(h)} a.e. and thus solves Problem 2.
Proposition 2 implies that Problem 3 is equivalent to Problem 2 and then, by
Proposition 1, also to Problem 1.
Since the demonstration of the above conditions (11)–(13) closely follows
Theorem 12.1 in Makowski and Neustadt (1974), we shall only reproduce those of
its parts that are of interest for our purposes. Notation is kept in its original terms.
The problem statement in Makowski and Neustadt (1974) consists in finding a
pair (x, u) such that:
qj uð ðtÞ; tÞ 0; a:e: j ¼ 1; . . .; s ð38Þ
x0ðtÞ ¼ f ðxðtÞ; uðtÞ; tÞ; a:e: ð39Þ
Xi xðt1Þ; xðt2Þ
  ¼ 0 i ¼ 1; . . .; h ð40Þ
Xi xðt1Þ; xðt2Þð Þ 0 i ¼ k þ 1; . . .; h þ h0 ð41Þ
pi xðtÞ; uðtÞ; tð Þ ¼ 0; a:e: i ¼ 1; . . .l ð42Þ
and which, in so doing, achieves a minimum for X0 xð ðt1Þ; xðt2ÞÞ.
Here, the parameter t is defined in ½t1; t2; u(t) represents an m-dimensional vector
of measurable, essentially bounded functions, with l B m; x(t) is an n-dimensional
vector of absolutely continuous functions. The mappings fðx; u; t), pi xð ; u; tÞ and
Xi xð Þ satisfy some provisos, called assumptions A1–A6, basically requiring that
they become continuously differentiable with respect to ðx; uÞ, but measurable and
almost bounded with respect to their third argument t. Besides, there are also some
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minimal regularity prerequisites, called conditions C1–C2, the most stringent of
which being that the matrix of partial derivatives of pi xð ; u; tÞ, with respect to the m
variables u, has rank l.
Theorem 12.1 Let (x*, u*) be a solution of our optimal control problem. Then
there exists a vector b ¼ b0; b1; . . .; bhþh0
 	
of parameters, essentially bounded
vector functions l ¼ l1; . . .; lsð Þ; v ¼ v1; . . .; vl ; and an n-dimensional vector
function W, all of them to be considered row-vector-valued, such that:
(1) |b| [ 0; b0 B 0
(2) W is absolutely continuous and satisfies:
W0ðtÞ ¼ W tð Þfxðx; u; tÞ  v tð Þ pxðx; u; tÞ; a:e ð43Þ
(3) For x1  xðt1Þ and x2  xðt2Þ; W satisfies the boundary conditions:
Wðt1Þ ¼ bXx1 ; Wðt2Þ ¼ bXx2 ð44Þ
(4) WðtÞfuðx; u; tÞ þ lðtÞ quðu; tÞ þ vðtÞpuðx; u; tÞ ¼ 0; a:e: ð45Þ
(5) lj tð Þ 0 and lj tð Þ qjðu tð Þ; tÞ ¼ 0; a:e: j ¼ 1; . . .; s
This re´sume´ of Theorem 12.1 will be applied to characterize the solution to
Problem 3. Notice that constraint (37) corresponds to [2.1]; (31), (33) and (36) to
[2.2]; (32) and (34) to [2.3]; and (35) to [2.5]. Similarly, the minimand in (30) is the
particular form adopted by the objective function X0 xð ðt1Þ; xðt2ÞÞ in Problem 3.
It should be emphasized that n*(h) appears represented in constraints [2.5]
through the third argument of pi xðtð Þ; uðt),tÞ: The representation is legitimate since
n*(h), being a monotonous function, is measurable and bounded a.e. as required by
assumptions A1–A6 in Makowski and Neustadt (1974). In fact, it can be checked
that Problem 3 fulfills, not only A1–A6, but, thanks to the linearity with respect to q
of the left-hand member of (26), also conditions C1–C2 in Makowski and Neustadt
(1974).
A straightforward application to Problem 3 of Theorem 12.1 above yields:
Zh00
h0
½MRðhÞ  MCðhÞf ðhÞdh ¼ 0 if h00 and h0 are a points of increase of qðhÞ
ð46Þ
We still need a result that will lead us from (4) to conditions (11)–(13):
Lemma 3 If h00 (or h0) is a point of increase belonging to an interval where q*(h)
is either continuous, or (and) strictly increasing, then MR h00ð Þ ¼ MC h00ð Þ (same
for h0).
Since q*(h) is non-decreasing and well-behaved, every point of increase belongs
to an open interval where q*(h) is either continuous or strictly increasing. Lemma 3
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then implies that condition (11) holds, as desired. This, together with (46), leads by
continuity to condition (12) provided that, thanks to Lemma 1, any interval of
singularity must be an interval of constancy. Finally, condition (13) is implied by
conditions (11)–(12), Restriction i and the continuity of both MR(h) and C0(q).
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